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LEVEL-OF-ASPIRATION THEORY 
AND INITIAL STANCE IN BARGAINING 
Bruce K. Mac Murray, Northeastern University 
Edward J. Lawler, University of Iowa 
This research focuses on the effect of initial stance in bargaining. Following level-of-
aspiration theory, the research examines whether the pattern of early concession 
making modifies the impact of tough vs. soft initial stance. The experiment manipulated 
opponent's concession pattern (decreasing, constant, increasing) in the early phase of 
bargaining within an overall tough or soft initial stance. Results indicated that a 
decreasing concession pattern within the early bargaining extracted larger initial 
concessions than a constant or increasing concession pattern. Implications for Siegel 
and Fouraker's (1960) level-of-aspiration theory are discussed. 
One of the major questions addressed by previous research on 
bargaining has been: What concession tactics produce the greatest 
yielding by opponents? This study is concerned with the approach of 
level-of-aspiration theory to this question. Level-of-aspiration theory 
(Siegel and Fouraker, 1960) suggests "it pays to be tough" because: 
(a) bargainers adjust their aspirations downward when an opponent 
adopts a tough concession stance, and (b) bargainers' concessions 
are inversely related to aspiration levels. The basic prediction of the 
theory is that a tough concession stance will produce more conces-
sion making than a softer concession stance (Siegel and Fouraker, 
1960). 
The most consistent support for the level-of-aspiration hypothesis 
has been found for initial offer. Numerous studies indicate that a 
tough initial offer extracts more concessions than a soft initial offer 
(Bateman, 1980; Chertkoff and Conley, 1967; Liebert, et al., 1968; 
YukI, 1974). However, research on concessions beyond the early 
period of bargaining reveals enough departures from this prediction 
to question the theory's applicability to ail phases of the bargaining 
encounter. Specifically, research has indicated that consistent 
toughness throughout the bargaining process may be seen as 
excessive by the other bargainer, produce little concession making in 
return (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981; Benton et al., 1972; Komorita 
and Brenner, 1968; Hamner, 1974; Pruitt, 1981), and result in a 
failure to reach agreement (Benton, et al., 1972; Hamner, 1974). 
Some support has been found for a matching strategy involving 
The authors are indebted to Keith Brokus for assistance in the data collection. Order 
of authorship was established randomly and does not reflect differential contributions. 
Requests for reprints should be sent to: Bruce K. Mac Murray, Department of 
Sociology/Anthropology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115. 
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reciprocity in concession making (Esser and Komorita, 1975; Komorita 
and Esser, 1975), a soft, reinforcement-based approach (Wall, 1977), 
and a mixed strategy combining tough and soft offers (Lawler and Mac 
Murray, 1980). 
One reason why empirical support for level-of-aspiration theory is 
strongest for the initial bargaining stance may be the role of 
"aspirations" in the theory. The theory must assume that aspirations 
are not fixed when parties enter negotiations — otherwise, there is no 
potential for change or manipulation of the aspiration levels. If we 
assume further that aspirations crystallize and solidify as the bar-
gaining progresses, one may expect that a tough bargaining stance 
will have the effect predicted by the theory primarily during the early 
phase of the bargaining. The present paper takes as its starting point 
two problems with theory and research in the level-of-aspiration 
tradition. First, the theory neglects the possibility that toughness may 
backfire and lead to intransigence on the part of the other bargainer 
(see Benton, et al., 1972; Hamner, 1974; Lawler and Mac Murray, 
1980). This is partly due to the fact that level-of-aspiration theory 
emphasizes only one dimension of impression management in 
bargaining, i.e., firmness or toughness (see Chertkoff and Esser, 
1976). Other research, however, indicates the importance of a second 
dimension, that of fairness or reasonableness. 
This dimension is particularly important because of the relevance it 
suggests for work done on equity and distributive justice processes in 
social exchange (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961; Thibaut and Kelley, 
1959; Walster, Berscheid, and Walster, 1976). This prior research 
suggests that a bargaining posture which is perceived as unfair or 
inequitable will create difficulties in successfully accomplishing a 
joint bargaining agreement. 
Second, previous tests of level-of-aspiration theory have simply 
translated the general hypothesis — tougher stances are more 
effective than softer ones — into the predictions that smaller con-
cessions are more effective than larger concessions (Druckman and 
Bonoma, 1976; Mac Murray, 1978). While the use of concession 
magnitude or size as an indicator of toughness is certainly justifiable, 
other aspects of concession behavior can also create (or undermine) 
impressions of toughness. This study examines concession patterns 
during the early phase of bargaining, classifying them as increasing, 
decreasing, or constant. An increasing pattern refers to an upward 
shift in concession magnitude across rounds, while a decreasing 
pattern refers to a downward shift. 
The major hypothesis of this study is based on the following 
assumption: concession patterns that violate the expectations of an 
opponent will produce greater adjustments in the opponent's aspira-
tion levels (upward or downward) and, hence, greater effects on the 
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esisthata 
by the opponent 
increasing or 
bargaining 
early in the 
pattern. This 
tancy violations 
To test the 
conception of 
initial offer, 
rounds to man 
particular levels 
need to include 
tion, one 
stance" is 
on the first 
dimension 
to manipulate 
Design and 
A 2 x 3 
concession 
stance (tou 
eighty-four 
of the six 
buyer in a " 
research, and 
and Fouraker 
of studies u 
Procedure 
Subjects 
Upon arriva 
two rooms, 
instructions 
would be pa 
One person 
Beta, and X\ 
actuality, all 
buyer role). 
36 
LEVEL-OF-ASPIRATION 
opponent's concession behavior. This assumption leads to the hypoth-
esis that a decreasing concession pattern will produce more yielding 
by the opponent because it conveys greater toughness than an 
increasing or constant pattern. The reason for this is that actors in 
bargaining expect yielding at a relatively constant or increasing rate 
early in the bargaining and that they will be surprised by a decreasing 
pattern. This relation between impressions of toughness and expec-
tancy violations has been neglected by the bargaining literature. 
To test the study's hypothesis, it is necessary to broaden the 
conception of initial bargaining stance to include more than only the 
initial offer. Specifically, we will utilize the first four of 15 bargaining 
rounds to manipulate the three patterns of concession making within 
particular levels of overall magnitude (tough vs. soft). Beyond the 
need to include more than one round for purposes of our manipula-
tion, one might argue that previous work on "initial bargaining 
stance" is unnecessarily restrictive and limited by the exclusive focus 
on the first offer. Creating a stable impression along the tough-soft 
dimension would seem to suggest that more than one round be used 
to manipulate initial bargaining stance. • 
Method 
Design and Subjects 
A 2 x 3 factorial design was utilized to allow the manipulation of 
concession pattern (increasing, constant, decreasing) and initial 
stance (tough vs. soft) during the first four rounds of bargaining for 
eighty-four subjects (42 males, 42 females) randomly assigned to one 
of the six experimental treatments. All subjects played the role of 
buyer in a "bilateral monopoly" setting similar to that used in prior 
research, and bargaining against a "programmed" opponent (Siegel 
and Fouraker, 1960; see also Chertkoff and Esser, 1976 for a review 
of studies using this technique). 
Procedure 
Subjects were scheduled in same sex groups of four to six persons. 
Upon arrival, the experimenter randomly assigned subjects to one of 
two rooms, and to separate cubicles within each room. Written 
instructions informed subjects that to maintain anonymity, they 
would be paired at random with one of the persons in the other room. 
One person would play the buyer (representative) for a nation called 
Beta, and the other would assume the role of seller for Alpha. In 
actuality, all subjects assumed the role of Beta's representative (the 
buyer role). 
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The bargaining issue was the price of iron ore. The instructions 
explained that two nations had engaged in preliminary discussions on 
this topic, but found that their offers were far apart. In the initial 
discussions, Beta (the buyer) had suggested a price of $5.00 per ton, 
while Alpha had suggested $12.00. The task of the buyer (subject) 
was to negotiate from this starting point and bargain for as low a price 
as possible. The instructions also contained an outcome list indicating 
the subject's profit at each of 29 potential agreement points (in 25-
cent intervals from $5.00 to $12.00). Subject's pay increased in 
10-cent intervals from $1.00 to $3.80, and was inversely related to 
the final agreement price. In the event of no agreement, subjects 
would obstensibly receive $1.00, the minimum pay on the outcome 
list. Information on the opponent's payoff was kept deliberately 
vague. 
The bargaining took place through written offers across a series of 
17 rounds. The programmed seller (Alpha's representative) made the 
first offer on each round and the buyer (subject) made the second or 
counteroffer. When making an offer, bargainers had three options: (a) 
stick with and repeat their last offer, (b) accept the last offer of the 
opponent, or (c) make a concession. The instructions explained that 
bargaining would continue until an agreement was reached or, if 
there was no agreement, at the end of 17 rounds. Once the bargaining 
was completed, a//subjects were paid $3.00, more than the maximum 
they could have earned in the bargaining. 
Experimental Manipulations 
Table 1 presents the concession patterns during the first four 
bargaining rounds within tough (i.e., $1.00) vs. soft (i.e., $3.00) initial 
stance. For each stance condition, concessions took the form of an 
increasing, constant, or decreasing pattern. From round five on, the 
programmed opponent matched (100% reciprocity) the concession 
behavior of the subject in both stance conditions. 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables were: (a) initial concession magnitude 
(through round 4), and (b) overall magnitude across all rounds. 
Concession magnitude was measured by the difference between the 
subject's second-to- last offer and the $5.00 beginning point for the 
bargaining.1 
A questionnaire administered between rounds 4 and 5 provided 
information on bargainers' impressions of the programmed opponent 
'Previous studies have found that "end effects" can create extreme time pressure on 
the last round and affect subjects' final offer (Benton, Kelley, and Liebling, 1972; Esser 
and Komorita, 1975). 
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for the early phase of the bargaining. This made possible the 
examination of impressions after the concession pattern and initial 
stance manipulations had just gone into effect. The questionnaire 
contained a series of bipolar adjective pairs. From these evaluations, 
two impression indices were constructed. The first and most impor-
tant for level-of-aspiration theory measured "firmness," while a 
second index provided evaluations of "reasonableness." The " f i rm" 
index consisted of the adjective pairs: firm- yielding, strong-weak, 
dominant-submissive, tough-soft; the "reasonableness" index was 
composed of sincere-insincere, credible-noncredible, likable-dislik-
able, reasonable-unreasonable and trustworthy-untrustworthy. 
Table 1 
Monetary Concessions for First Four Rounds 
of Experimental Condition 
Round 
Treatment group 1 2 3 4 
Tough ($1.00) 
Increase 0 0 50 
Constant 25 25 25 
Decrease 50 50 0 
Soft ($3.00) 
Increase 0 0 150 
Constant 75 75 75 
Decrease 150 150 0 
Table 2 
Overall and Initial Concession Magnitude 
by Experimental Condition 
Initial Stance 
Tough 
Soft 
Tough 
Soft 
Increase 
3.05 
1.18 
2.36 
1.57 
Concession Pattern 
Constant 
Overall concession 
2.88 
.84 
Initial concession 
2.45 
1.59 
Decrease 
3.05 
1.30 
2.64 
2.11 
50 
25 
0 
150 
75 
0 
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Results 
Table 2 reports the mean values for each dependent variable by 
experimental condition. No interaction effects were found between 
initial stance and concession pattern on either initial magnitude, F 
(1.72) = 1.173,/? = .58; or for overall magnitude, F(1,72) = 1.07, p - .36. 
Examinations of these results by sex indicated no interactions with 
the independent variables. Analysis of variance did reveal sex main 
effects, however, as males made larger magnitude overall conces-
sions, ^(1,72) = 5.693, p < .03 and also larger initial concessions than 
females, F (1,72) = 5.571, p < .03. 
Concession Pattern 
Turning to the concession pattern, the planned comparison indi-
cated an effect on initial magnitude supporting our major hypothesis 
that the decreasing pattern would yield larger concessions than the 
other two conditions (constant and increasing) combined, t=2.08,p < 
.025, one-tailed, means were = 1.71 vs. 1.30. It appears, however, 
that this pattern effect was only temporary (for the early bargaining 
phase) as no pattern effects were found for overall magnitude, means 
were = 2.85 vs. 2.69. 
Initial Stance 
A main effect for initial stance on overall magnitude replicates prior 
research (Bateman, 1980; Chertkoff and Conley, 1967; Liebert, et al., 
1972; Yukl, 1974b) and supports level-of-aspiration theory. A tough 
initial stance extracted larger overall concessions from an opponent 
than did a soft stance, F (1,72) = 32.49, p < .001, means were = 2.99 
vs. 2.48. Main effect for stance on initial magnitude, however, 
contradicts level-of-aspiration theory as a soft stance yielded larger 
early phase concessions than the tough stance, F (1,72) = 13.90, p < 
.001, means were = 1.76 vs. 1.11. 
Impression Measures 
The adjective evaluations revealed effects for initial stance such 
that: the tough stance was viewed as more " f i rm" by bargainers, F 
(1,72) = 26.11, p < .001, means were = 5.6 vs. 4.4, while the soft 
stance was seen as more"reasonable", F (1,72) = 11.19 p < .001, 
means were = 5.8 vs. 5.1. The data on bargainer's evaluations also 
indicated that adopting a decreasing concession pattern was viewed 
as "firmer" than the other patterns combined, t = 8.55, p < .01, 
one-tailed, means were = 6.0 vs. 4.5; this pattern was also seen as 
less "reasonable" by bargainers, t = 3.97, p < .01, one-tailed, means 
were = 4.5 vs. 5.4. 
2The regression of overall concession magnitude with "firmness" and "reasonable-
ness" revealed an R2 = .25 and for initial magnitude, R2 = .08. 
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an overall tough stance. These seemingly contradictory results can be 
attributed to the fact that concession pattern and levels of concession 
The relative importance of " f i rm" vs. "reasonable" impressions 
was assessed by a regression of these indices on initial concession 
magnitude and overall magnitude. The results indicate that impres-
sions of "firmness" have a greater impact on early (b* = .29, p < .01) 
and overall (b* = .48, p < .001) concessions than impressions of 
"reasonableness" (b* = .15, n.s. and .06, n.s., respectively).2 Con-
sistent with level-of-aspiration theory, these results suggest that 
impressions of "firmness" are the most crucial in bargaining. 
Discussion 
The present research was based on two assumptions: First, that 
facets of concession behavior other than concession magnitude (or 
size) affect impressions of toughness. Second, aspects of concession 
behavior which violate expectations are likely to produce greater 
effects on such impressions. The major hypothesis was that a 
decreasing concession pattern would produce more yielding than a 
constant or increasing concession pattern. In addition, the study 
attempted to replicate the effect for tough vs. soft initial stances. 
The research found support for our major hypothesis — namely, 
that a decreasing pattern of concession making would be more 
effective than a constant or increasing pattern during the early phase 
of bargaining. The hypothesis suggested that a decreasing pattern 
would be perceived as tougher than the other patterns and, consistent 
with level-of-aspiration theory, that this should result in greater 
yielding. Data on adjective evaluations corroborated the impact of 
concession pattern on impressions by indicating that the decreasing 
pattern was seen as "firmer" than the other patterns. 
Turning to the comparison of tough vs. soft initial stances, the major 
prediction of level-of-aspiration theory — a tough initial stance 
extracts more overall concession making from an opponent than a 
soft initial stance — was replicated in the current research. However, 
this study also found greater early yielding in response to a soft initial 
stance, a result contrary to level-of-aspiration theory. 
Previous research and the current study indicated that a tough 
strategy will yield larger overall concessions in bargaining, although 
at some risk of not reaching agreement (Hamner, 1974; Lawler and 
Mac Murray, 1980). For the early bargaining phase, the results from 
the current study do not consistently support level-of-aspiration 
theory. On the one hand, a decreasing concession pattern (i.e., the 
one perceived as most firm) produces the most yielding; on the other 
hand, an overall soft initial stance produces more early yielding than 
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magnitude (i.e., toughness) have quite different meanings in the 
context of bargaining. The tough initial stance may appear overly 
tough in the early bargaining phase and hence engender intransi-
gence or little concession making from an opponent during the early 
phase (Benton, et al., 1972; Esser and Komorita, 1975; Hamner, 
1974). However, if agreement is to be reached, a tough stance must, 
by necessity, produce greater yielding overall. The impact of initial 
toughness is, in part, a function of the pressure to reach agreement 
which builds as the deadline approaches. 
A decreasing pattern of concessions, on the other hand, while also 
tough or firm, must involve significant yielding initially, in order to 
allow for a decrease in concession level to occur (see Table 1). This 
initial yielding may communicate reasonableness and induce con-
cession making during the early bargaining phase. While these two 
features of concession behavior (a tough initial stance and a 
decreasing pattern) both communicate bargaining toughness, they do 
so in different ways. As a result, the immediate response to the 
decreasing pattern of concession is more yielding, but less yielding in 
response to a tough initial stance. 
The broadest implication of this research is that bargainers can 
convey firmness in a number of different ways, each of which is 
subject to analysis from the standpoint of level-of-aspiration theory. 
Concession magnitude and concession patterns offer two facets of 
concession behavior with which bargainers may convey firmness. 
The effectiveness of different concession sizes appears to depend on 
the degree to which a bargainer adjusts the concession to avoid an 
impression of excessive intransigence. 
These results both serve to extend and specify the scope of level-of-
aspiration theory. Additionally, they suggest the relevance of con-
cerns with equity for bargaining interactions. Hence, although 
perceived toughness is clearly important in negotiations as suggested 
by level-of- aspiration, so too are impressions of fairness and equity. A 
bargainer who overemphasizes firmness runs the risk of not reaching 
an agreement based on perceived injustice, while the adoption of a 
stance which accentuates reasonableness, may be seen as weak, 
potentially leading to a disadvantageous agreement. 
The effectiveness of different concession patterns appears to 
depend on whether the pattern violates the other's expectations and 
incorporates concessions that create a balance of firmness and 
reasonableness. This study has treated the influence of expectations 
as an implicit theoretical idea in the level-of-aspiration theory 
argument. As a consequence, the present research only indirectly 
examined these expectations. Future research is needed employing 
experimental manipulations and measurement to focus more directly 
on the influence of expectations to clarify this important issue. 
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